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In the initial phase, Japan would overrun the Philippines and other US possessions in the western Pacific. The next phase centered around the dispatch of the US Pacific Fleet to conduct a series of islandhopping battles in the Japanese-held mandate islands in the central Pacific. To prevail in this campaign, USN battleships had to have superior protection, long-range hitting power, a high level of protection against destroyer and aircraft attack, and great endurance.

Oklahoma leads two other battleships in March in a line ahead. The ships have their main batteries trained to starboard probably for a gunnery exercise.

This was the epitome of naval power during the period, and USN strategy and tactics rested upon the power of its battleships. Three aircraft could be carried as shown here. The battleship was the most powerful ship of its era because of its balance of offensive and defensive strengths. The most obvious attribute of a battleship was its big guns, which gave it immense hitting power and range.

This made it superior to all smaller ships. Most battleships were designed to include protection against a counterpart armed with weapons equivalent to those carried by the battleship itself.

For example, American battleships armed with inch guns were protected against the fire of an enemy ship equipped with inch guns. This level of protection meant that only a battleship could sink another battleship unless the ship was placed in an unfavorable tactical situation where it could be threatened by torpedoes or mines.

Of course, aircraft became the principal enemy of battleships during World War II, but when the USN designed its superdreadnoughts the advent of aircraft as a real threat against a heavily armored warship was not foreseen. The USN responded by embarking on a program of building dreadnoughts, beginning with the South Carolina BB 26 , which was commissioned in Up through , the USN brought into service ten dreadnoughts in five classes.

The four earliest classes were equipped with 12inch guns, but the New York class, commissioned in , jumped up to inch guns. Two others, Utah and Wyoming, had been demilitarized under the terms of the London Naval Treaty of April 22, , and had been converted to training ships.

The other five dreadnoughts had been scrapped in accordance with the terms of the Washington Naval Treaty. The high costs of building dreadnoughts and the displacement restrictions of the naval treaties meant that each USN battleship design had to carefully weigh the requirements for firepower, speed, and protection and find an appropriate balance among the three.

Generally, American designers emphasized firepower and then protection, with speed coming in a distinct third. Beginning with the Nevada class, the USN produced a series of battleship classes that were remarkably alike. The power of these ships compared to earlier dreadnoughts prompted naval observers to dub them superdreadnoughts. Traditional armored protection schemes focused on a heavy main belt, since battle ranges were 10, yards or less.

This arrangement was no longer viable as engagement ranges were extended. Now shells could hit anywhere, not just on the side of the ship when limited battle ranges meant a low shell trajectory. Most likely, armor-piercing AP shells would be used against battleships, and these could only be defeated by increasing the thickness of armor over key areas.

Areas that did not cover vital areas were left unarmored. This allowed the available weight of armor to be concentrated on the areas that mattered most. American practice focused on defeating AP rounds that could penetrate to the vitals of the ship. The effect of high-explosive rounds, which would burst on contact with even light armor and create great destruction topside but not penetrate to vital areas, was seen as a lesser danger. This concept was well ahead of its time and provided the best possible protection at long ranges.

In addition to plunging fire from other battleships, the interwar period saw the continued technological improvement of aircraft that had the potential of threatening the mighty battleship. Aircraft bombs would have to be dropped from fairly high altitudes to gain enough velocity to penetrate armored decks. The higher the altitude, the more time the maneuvering battleship had to evade the bomb, which made high-level bombing a very unpromising form of attack.

The ineffectiveness of this form of attack was amply demonstrated during World War II. Therefore, dive-bombing could cripple a battleship, but not sink it. Beginning with the Nevada class, American battleship designers assumed greater battle ranges, and thus the need to provide more armor on the main deck was recognized. A separate splinter deck was provided below the main armor deck to catch splinters should a shell or bomb penetrate the main deck.

These two armored decks provided over 8 inches of armor over key areas on the New Mexico class. USN battleships achieved this level of armored protection by reducing the amount of the ship that needed to be protected. This was done by several means. The number of turrets was minimized, thus reducing the length of the vital area. From right to left are Mississippi, New Mexico, and Idaho. Because none of the ships underwent extensive modernization during the war, their appearances are still similar.

However, subtle differences can be seen in the bridge structures and in their radar fits. All three ships are in the Measure 21 Navy Blue scheme. Idaho leads Mississippi and New Mexico. These were considered by the USN as its most powerful battleships, since they had the benefit of full modernizations before the war. When the Atlantic Fleet had to be reinforced in mid, the New Mexico class was selected, and when King pressured Nimitz to commit the older battleships to combat in the South Pacific, these ships came the closest to seeing action.

The modernization of all four ships of the Nevada and Pennsylvania classes gave them virtually identical appearances and capabilities. A lower speed was also accepted, which reduced the need for larger machinery spaces. Interwar Reconstruction of American Battleships The Washington Naval Treaty precluded new battleship construction, so the USN was forced to upgrade the combat capabilities of its existing ships.

The Nevada, Pennsylvania, and New Mexico classes were seen as deficient in several important measures, so the modernization work was a virtual reconstruction. The Washington Naval Treaty actually forbade reconstruction, so major work on the main belt or main battery was precluded, but there were still significant upgrades in firepower, protection, and propulsion. All three classes were seen as negligent in underwater protection, so this was a top priority.

All were blistered, which meant that the explosion of a torpedo or mine would occur at a stand-off distance from the hull, thus minimizing damage.

The horizontal protection of the ships against long-range plunging fire was also improved. Firepower was improved by increasing the maximum gun elevations, which gave longer ranges. This was accomplished in spite of a treaty clause that specifically banned such an improvement.

The ship presents a powerful and graceful appearance with its clipper bow, large bridge structure, and four triple inch turrets.

The ship can be easily identified from earlier USN dreadnoughts by her larger bridge structure and clipper bow. New fire-control systems were added to the Nevada and Pennsylvania classes on large tripod masts. The USN considered that any engagement beyond 20, yards would have to be aided by spotting from aircraft, so provisions were made to fit catapults on all battleships in order that aircraft could be carried.

The usual configuration was one catapult fitted on the quarterdeck and another on the top of the superfiring aft turret. The secondary battery was moved from its hull casemates to the deckhouse, where it could be operated in all weather conditions. The propulsion system was upgraded using the machinery from the canceled South Dakota class of six battleships which were laid down in , but canceled in —23 to meet the restrictions of the Washington Naval Treaty.

This extra power was sufficient to negate the resistance from the massive bulges. Even so, speed was still an issue, with the Nevada, Pennsylvania, and New Mexico classes not exceeding 21 knots. This made them inferior to RN battleships, and more importantly, Japanese battleships. The New Mexico class received the most extensive modernizations, which will be described later. The forward inch turret aboard Nevada trained to starboard and preparing to fire on targets on Iwo Jima in February The effect of a inch shell against land targets, even ones that were highly fortified, was highly destructive, which made older USN battleship very effective gunfire support platforms.

American Battleship Weapons The three classes covered in this book all carried a inch gun main battery. Adoption of the larger weapon placed the survival of previous inch-gun-equipped ships at risk, since they were not armored against such a threat.

This gun was capable of a high rate of fire in the hands of a welldrilled crew, but it suffered from a relatively short range.

It was intended that all USN battleships be fitted with this weapon, but only those ships damaged at Pearl Harbor and forced into long repair periods had the opportunity to receive them. The longer the gun, the longer the period of acceleration, so the higher the velocity.

Higher velocity increased penetration, but also increased the wear on the barrel. Adoption of triple inch turrets helped to reduce weight and avoided the inefficient placement of the main battery in previous classes. This decision to go to a triple turret was made before the design for a triple turret existed, so this was a decision with some risk. When introduced, the turret was successful. An initial problem with salvo dispersion was addressed by introducing a short interval between the firings of the three barrels in the turret.

The triple turret on the Nevada class came in at tons, while those on the Pennsylvania class weighed between and tons. Both had a firing cycle of some 50 seconds. The New Mexico class introduced a new triple turret with the guns in separate slides, which reduced the risk that all three guns could be knocked out by a single well-placed enemy shell. This new turret weighed tons and had a firing cycle of 45 seconds. The provision of a powerful secondary battery was an important design consideration on USN dreadnoughts.

Destroyers were a real threat to battleships, since the torpedoes they carried could defeat the underwater protection of most such ships. The Americans believed that secondary battery guns had a longer range than Japanese torpedoes the development of the Japanese oxygen-propelled Type 93 torpedo with its maximum range of 43, yards was undreamed of , so a powerful secondary battery offered the best defense against torpedo attack.

It finally reached the fleet in early , but was plagued by jamming problems and heavy maintenance requirements. It was replaced as soon as possible by the much more effective 40mm quad mount. American battleships went to war with an inadequate level of antiaircraft protection, as demonstrated by the experiences of the RN in Europe. This was not possible to achieve before the war due to production problems and the impossibility of pulling ships out of service for lengthy refits.

The interim solution was the addition of four 1. USN battleships were also deficient in short- and medium-range antiaircraft weapons at the start of the war. The eight. The 1. These were replaced as quickly as possible with the 40mm Bofors gun, usually in quad mounts but also by limited numbers of twin mounts. The 40mm quad mount proved very effective in service. Fire control was provided by the Mark 51 director and the weapon proved effective out to about 3, yards. The standard short-range antiaircraft weapon from was the Swiss-designed 20mm Oerlikon gun.

This weapon was air-cooled, required no external power source, and was comparatively lightweight, so it could be fitted in large numbers aboard big ships like battleships. It was originally fitted as only a single mount, but late in the war a twin mount was provided to increase firepower in the face of the kamikaze threat. The 20mm was a last-ditch weapon, only effective to about 1, yards. The 40mm Bofors gun was fitted to all older USN battleships, beginning in late The gun proved very successful in service and was the best intermediate-range antiaircraft gun of the war.

The weapon was effective out to about 3, yards. Fire control was provided by the Mark 51 director. A group of 20mm single mounts on Idaho in May with their Marine gunners. The 20mm was a useful weapon with its high rate of fire, and large numbers were fitted on all battleships. The weapon had an effective range of about 1, yards, which was useful against conventional air attack, but against suicide aircraft attack it was quickly found that the 20mm shell was not large enough to knock down a kamikaze before it hit the ship.

The first radar fitted aboard a battleship was the experimental CXAM radar, which had a large mattress antenna usually mounted on the foremast.

This set had a theoretical maximum detection range of 16nm against large surface targets and 70nm against large aircraft at 10, feet. In , this was replaced by the SC radar.

The improved SC-1 was more successful, since its greater power translated into almost twice the range compared to the SC. This could detect a large target at up to nm flying at 10, feet. Late in the war, Pennsylvania received the complementary SP radar, which had a 50nm maximum range against a large, high-flying target, but provided fairly good elevation accuracy.

It was thus critical for guiding fighters against kamikazes. The mainstay surface search radar was the SG. This was the first microwave radar to incorporate a display, which made interpretation much easier. Battleships first received this radar in early , and the improved SG-1 entered service in May Battleships often received two SG radars, one each on the foremast and the mainmast.

Range was 22nm against a large surface target. They featured a heavy inch gun main battery, which made them the contemporary of ships being built by the RN known as superdreadnoughts. Initially, the USN looked at simply upgrading the previous New York class, but the scope of the desired improvements in protection made this impossible. Work began in late Construction was planned to take three years, but in fact took longer, with Nevada entering service in March and Oklahoma two months later.

When completed, the ships presented a balanced and powerful appearance, with two main turrets forward and aft, a small bridge structure, two large cagemasts, and a single stack. This view from shows one of the earliest additions to Nevada in the form of a short aircraft platform on top of Turret 2.

This proved too dangerous to operate aircraft and was soon removed. Note the austere bridgework and the armored conning tower behind the aircraft platform from which the ship was controlled during battle. The most prominent feature of USN battleships during this period was their cagemasts.

The USN preferred these to the tripod masts of other navies, since it was believed they were more resistant to damage as enemy shells could pass through the structure without bringing it down. Though close to completion, the ship presents a very austere appearance, typical of the USN battleships of the period. Compared to its European and Japanese counterparts of , the Nevada class performed favorably, particularly in terms of horizontal protection.

This allowed a much greater emphasis on deck protection. Total weight of armor was 11, tons, of which only 3, was allocated to the main belt. The armored deck and the splinter deck had a combined 3, tons. Overall, armor was 40 percent of the design displacement. Almost half of the main belt was below the waterline, which tapered to 8 inches at its lowest point. The armored citadel was completed forward and aft by armored bulkheads with a maximum armor thickness of 13 inches.

The turret barbettes received 13 inches of armor, the conning tower 16 inches, and the turret faces 18 inches. Horizontal protection totaled 3 inches of armor in three different layers that extended over the same length as the main belt.

Underwater protection was minimal and was soon seen as a major weakness. Not apparent in this view are the twin inch superfiring turrets, which were the best way to distinguish her from later classes.

Oklahoma is wearing a Measure 5 Painted Bow Wave camouflage scheme. The lower profile shows Nevada as she appeared in after she returned to the Pacific. Nevada presents a dramatically different appearance from The bridge structure has been modified and the unique stack configuration is apparent. This naval base at Guantanamo was heavily used as a training and exercise facility by the USN because of the year-round good weather.

Propulsion Previous USN battleships relied on coal with a supplement of oil. The advantages of going to an all-oil arrangement were considerable, and included the facts that oil took less space, had a greater thermal content and would thus offer a greater radius for the same amount of fuel, made replenishment at sea possible, and dispensed with the issue of dealing with coal dust on sensitive equipment.

Oilfired ships required smaller boiler rooms, which also meant that the number of boiler room personnel could be drastically reduced. The smaller boiler rooms reduced the amount of the ship to be protected. Nevada was the first battleship to go all-oil.

Nevada was powered by Curtis direct-drive turbines and Oklahoma by reciprocating engines of the type fitted on previous USN battleships. This machinery generated 25, shaft horsepower shp on Nevada and 24, indicated horsepower on Oklahoma.

This was adequate for just over 20 knots on both ships, clearly inferior to foreign counterparts. Each ship required only a single stack to vent the exhaust from the compact machinery spaces. Armament The arrangement of the main battery was unique to this class. To mount the same ten inch guns as on the preceding New York class, it was decided to use triple gun turrets for the first time. Nevada used two of these, one fore and one aft, combined with a dual turret fitted in a superfiring position to provide the ten-gun inch broadside.

Two submerged inch torpedo tubes were also fitted. These proved totally useless in practice, and having an unprotected explosive source down low in the hull was also a vulnerability.

All USN battleships had their submerged torpedo tubes removed during their major reconstruction. To assist in routine navigation, a small bridge was built abaft the armored conning tower that was suited to and designed for navigating and fighting the ship in battle.

The secondary battery was reduced from 21 to 12 5-inch guns, and two 3-inch guns were added for antiaircraft protection. In , flying-off platforms were added on the two superfiring inch turrets.

These were replaced by a catapult placed aft on the quarterdeck in By , the 3-inch antiaircraft battery was increased to eight guns. As has already been mentioned, USN battleships underwent extensive modernization during the interwar period.

For the Nevada class this took place from to Both ships lost their cagemasts in favor of heavy tripod masts, and the bridge structure was substantially enlarged to handle the increasingly numerous and complicated equipment required for a modern fighting ship. Two catapults were added, one on the aft twin 14inch turret and the other on the quarterdeck aft. Antitorpedo bulges were added, which increased the depth of torpedo protection to 22 feet. In addition, the boiler rooms were provided with torpedo bulkheads and a triple bottom was also incorporated.

The upper armored deck was increased to 5 inches and parts of the lower armored deck increased to as much as 3 inches.

All told, an extra 1, tons of armor were added. Both ships also had six new boilers installed, and Nevada had her reciprocating engines replaced by new geared turbines from the canceled battleship North Dakota. In addition to providing the main guns with increased elevation, all casemate 5-inch guns were moved one deck up.

A light antiaircraft capability was added in the form of eight. New catapults replaced the older ones but remained in the same locations. When completed, the ships displaced 30, tons. In and , both ships had the height of their stacks increased.

In her February refit, Oklahoma was earmarked to receive four 1. Note the larger forward superstructure and the elimination of the casemates along the hull. The prominent piece of equipment on top of the bridge is the primary rangefinder for the main battery. A back-up rangefinder can be seen on top of Turret 2. The aft tower mast has been removed, but the forward one remains.

The single stack has been lengthened, giving her a unique recognition feature. The four inch searchlights were moved from the stack to the mainmast to get them higher up.

Nevada was the first of the severely damaged battleships at Pearl Harbor to be refitted and became a general template for the other five wartime reconstructions. By using our website you consent to all cookies in accordance with our Cookie Policy.

View as: Grid List. Enter your email address below to sign up to our General newsletter for updates from Osprey Publishing, Osprey Games and our parent company Bloomsbury. Tell us about a book you would like to see published by Osprey. At the beginning of every month we will post the 5 best suggestions and give you the chance to vote for your favourite. New Vanguard. Ambushes were sometimes large-scale, elaborate, and deadly.

Others were simply harassing attacks, but still lethal. The unarmored and mostly unarmed cargo trucks, including wheel tractor-trailers, were extremely vulnerable, and certain road sectors offering favorable terrain to the enemy were notorious as frequent ambush sites.

Free World infantry units were committed to offensive operations and could not fully secure the numerous and lengthy routes. Military police MP units were few in number and their resources too limited to escort the big convoys. Unarmored machine-gun armed jeeps were also of little value as they were too vulnerable. Counter-ambush tactics were developed and improved over time. These early gun trucks were less than effective. The sandbag protection left much to be desired, and when wet from monsoon rains it added too much weight.

More firepower was also necessary. Armor plate was installed and numerous machine guns were therefore mounted: weapons included. Big Bad John discarded the shields for the two side M60s, while King Cobra retained them for its side.

The rear troop ramp was not used for entry and exit, but rather the smaller hatch set in the ramp. It mounted two M60 machine guns removed here on pedestal mounts behind the cab. This arrangement could prevent both guns from firing to one side. In the background are the types of barracks drivers and gun-truckers lived in.

The two leftmost trucks are APC gun trucks. While every task truck assigned to a convoy had to be double checked for serviceability before setting out, the convoy commander knew that the gun trucks were ready and required no additional inspection. They began to be replaced by 5-ton cargo trucks. The result was a number of formidable gun trucks, complete with gaudily painted boisterous and vengeful names. MA1 armored personnel carrier APC hulls were even mounted on 5-ton trucks for all-round armor protection.

These vehicles were purely defensive weapon systems suited for convoy escort and base perimeter security. Up to trucks were modified to become gun trucks during the course of the war. While most were used by long-haul transportation units, other US units also built gun trucks — some combat engineer battalions converted one or more 5-ton M51 dump trucks to gun trucks to escort their own convoys to worksites.

Besides a dump truck, the M51 was fitted with removable troop seats in the dump bed, allowing it to be used to transport engineer squads. There were instances in the past when cargo trucks and jeeps were provided with add-on armor and sometimes armament for special purposes, but this was rare and not near the scale and effort undertaken in Vietnam. Eight motor transportation battalions motor transport served in Vietnam: the 6th, 7th, 27th, 36th, 39th, 54th, 57th, and th.

Not all made heavy use of gun trucks, just those involved with line haul convoys, while the 6th and 7th Trans Battalions assigned to the 48th Trans Group did not employ gun trucks. The heaviest users of gun trucks were the 27th, 54th, and th Battalions of the 8th Trans Group. There were also seven petroleum truck companies and one reefer truck company. Truck transportation companies, regardless of type, were similarly organized.

They possessed a company headquarters with the commanding officer CO; there was no executive officer — XO , first sergeant, truckmaster, assistant truckmaster, mess steward, supply sergeant, armorer, company clerk, supply clerk, parts supply specialist, dispatcher, seven cooks, switchboard operator, and driver. The reefer truck maint section was similar, but added 15 refrigeration specialists.

Platoons had two cargo squads, each with a squad leader, five senior drivers, and 15 drivers. The vehicle mounted two single. Note the open OVE storage compartment just aft of the cab. The 78gal fuel tank is on the other side of this M Behind the flags are a massive ton M truck-tractor and a ton M15A2 tank transporter semi-trailer.

A as needed. It was not uncommon for POL companies to place most of their fuel trailers in static tank farms and instead hauled ton semi-trailers.

Gun trucks were allocated one or two per truck platoon. This technique, however, served only to separate the gun-truckers from the platoons they protected. By making the gun-truckers part of the platoons, they lived and worked side-byside with the task truck drivers and developed a sense of being part of the unit they protected, improving camaraderie and unit cohesion.

TTPs also inspected documents, and dispatched loaded or empty trailers for convoys, provided emergency repairs on trucks and trailers, and maintained POL dispensing facilities for refueling vehicles. The man batteries were organized into three eight-gun platoons, each divided into four two-gun sections. One gun crew constituted a squad. They typically operated in two-gun sections. These are higher than found on later gun trucks. Some 0. Armament is a 7. Note the elaborate side mirrors mounted on the fenders, providing increased vision to the rear.

At this time, gun trucks did not bear names and extravagant markings. These were often painted over on later gun trucks. Some were mounted reversed, with the M60 compartment in the rear.

A pedestal-mounted. The shield walls were fabricated from standard-issue side panels. A folding cot sits on top and clothes dry on the radio antenna. The interior of MA1 APCs were painted pale mint green lighting effect makes this one appear light tan. Gun truck crews Gun truck crews were selected from among the most experienced drivers. They volunteered and had to prove themselves worthy. Prospective gun-truckers were naturally aggressive, wanting a piece of the action rather than settling for just being a passive driver.

They yearned to be part of the elite within transport companies. To earn consideration, they had to prove themselves first by running dozens of combat convoys, gaining road war experience. They were expected to fix immediately any deficiency found, to do any chore needed without being ordered.

They were motivated enough that they did not attempt to avoid motor stables routine vehicle maintenance and were expected to stay on the job for as long as it took, all night if necessary. The gun trucks were ridden hard and fast and as many as possible had to be available for convoy duty. Prospective gun-truckers had to fit in with the close-knit crew, which had its own personality.

Gun-truckers tended to be flamboyant, but generally kept to themselves when off-duty. Most gun-truckers possessed a series military occupation specialty MOS. MOS 64B heavy truck drivers were qualified to drive the same vehicles as 64As, but also 5-ton and ton tractor-trailers.

Occasionally wheeled vehicle mechanics MOS 63A and 63B were on gun truck crews, and it was not uncommon for bored infantrymen MOS 11B , tied down securing bases along convoy routes, to volunteer for the duty. All could handle any 1st echelon operator maintenance. They were trained to operate radios, perform first aid, call for artillery and air support, and medevac choppers. It was found that if the crew was too small it was impossible to maintain degree observation, which was critical.

Dahl, th Trans Company gun truck Brutus. With their truck inspection completed, task truck drivers are briefed by the convoy commander before setting out on a dangerous and physically exhausting convoy through the Central Highlands.

The acetatecovered board in his hand provides the standing operating procedures SOP. The old floor and sidewall sandbags have been stacked in the center and double sidewalls made of aircraft landing mats are being installed. Gun truck crews constantly remodeled and upgraded their beloved trucks. The long-haul cargo convoys traveling through hostile territory ranged from 20 to trucks and support vehicles.

This system reduced bunching and the accordion effect when vehicles were forced to slow down on inclines, poor road surfaces, etc.

Long-haul convoys initially used ten-truck serials escorted by a gun truck with five-minute intervals between serials. The cab was protected by an armored windshield and doors. The normal spare tire rack aft of the cab was not used, as it was slow to remove tires from there. The cargo bed was protected by an armor kit with four pre-fab panels, each with a vision port, which were considered unnecessary.

On the opposite side the third from the front panel was cut down on the left side similarly to give the gunners more freedom of movement. There was no forward armor for the cargo bed and there was a narrow opening in the rear. The ends of the bumper were painted, as were the bummer guide rods. Often, burned-out.

Invader II mounted three. All 5-ton dump trucks, unlike most other 5-ton models, had winches. The Eve of Destruction on convoy escort duty. The Eve today is displayed at the Transportation Corps Museum. It required at least three men to provide effective degrees observation and man the weapons. There would be one gun truck per ten task trucks. There would be many variations of serial organization and size.

These commanders did not always lead from the front, but the convoy commander would be in the middle and serial commanders tailed their serial. Such positioning allowed them to see what was going on ahead: arm signals from drivers, erratic speed, incoming enemy fire, truck breakdowns, etc. Convoy and serial commanders and gun trucks had radios allowing contact with one another as well as with artillery and air support. The convoy commander would also be on the frequency of the security unit whose sector they were passing through, and would have to change frequencies in each sector.

Arm signals and headlights were used for other signaling activities, as were colored smoke grenades and signal flares red meant enemy contact. Convoys of contracted Vietnamese tractor-trailers usually of Japanese manufacture were also organized and required escort. Experienced drivers pacesetters headed each serial and would regulate the speed as required by road conditions. Typical speeds were 25—35mph, faster in high-risk areas. When passing through villages, the vehicles slowed to 15mph.

Military Police MPs would actually issue speeding citations when convoys passed through their sectors, and there were instances when convoy commanders used their escorting MPs to keep other MPs away, rather than halting parts of their convoy and breaking it up.

It was extremely difficult to hit a rapidly moving target with an rocket-propelled grenade RPG or recoilless gun. An open-column convoy called for m intervals between trucks; often five truck lengths were specified. The vehicles would close up somewhat on extremely winding roads and at night. Heavier and slower vehicles were placed at the head of the convoy. However, knowing that the enemy would attempt to halt the ammunition and fuel trucks, they were sometimes placed at the rear of the convoy, so that if halted they would not trap other trucks.

Additional gun trucks and other escorts would accompany this portion of a convoy. The drivers were not to stop to assist halted trucks — the trail element took care of that. Yet there were many instances of drivers halting under intense fire to rescue drivers of damaged trucks. They even pulled up beside burning ammunition and fuel trucks to save their buddies. Convoys were planned 24 hours in advance. The battalion S-3 issued a list of trucks assigned to the convoy and the S-2 provided intelligence on recent enemy activity along the route.

Task trucks were loaded with their cargo at depots and ammunition supply points, usually the day before the convoy departed. This procedure was specified by the quartermaster supply unit. The vehicles assembled in march-order at a marshalling area and lined up by serial. They sold drinks, snacks, and souvenirs and would bring their children to demonstrate they had no hostile intent. The Devil Woman mounted five. The Vietnamese child makes the M54 truck appear larger than it is.

The truck sits on M8A1 aircraft landing mats, which were sometimes used for inner walls for double-walled gun truck gun boxes. Here a 5-ton M52 tractor-trailer with a ton M semi-trailer passes a damaged 5-ton M54 cargo truck outside a highway checkpoint. While agile and able to move quickly up and down the length of a convoy, they were too light to be effective gun trucks. They could only carry minimal armor and seldom anything more than M60s, here a twin mount in the cab and single gun in the rear.

Maintain distance from the vehicle ahead; five truck lengths. Maintain communications and watch for signals. Weapons locked and loaded upon departure. Helmet and body armor on. Pay attention to surroundings and nearby civilian activity.

Avoid civilian vehicles, but if they interfere to slow down the convoy for attack, hook them with a bumper and push them out of the way. In event of a breakdown, drivers stay with their vehicles and security will be provided. Do not pass vehicles unless they are disabled. If a disabled vehicle is blocking the road, push it out of the way if possible.

If receiving fire, drive out of the kill zone. No stopping under any circumstances, unless suffering an incapacitating wound. Gun trucks are authorized to fire on anything suspicious. Task truck drivers only fire to defend themselves. Once out of the start point SP , the gun trucks test-fired their weapons, providing a morale boast to the drivers.

Army scout helicopters might patrol the route and they could bring in gunships armed with rockets and machine guns. The entire convoy route could be covered by artillery fire from different firebases. Such overwhelming fire support was only called upon during a heavy ambush, if the gun trucks could not handle it. The main convoy counterambush tactic was for the task trucks to keep moving no matter what, and for the gun trucks to lay down suppressive fire.

Many ambushes were merely harassing in nature, as were mines and command-detonated explosives. Random sniper attacks were a nuisance. The enemy seldom attempted to halt an entire convoy and close in with a costly ground assault. They satisfied themselves damaging a few trucks and knocking out one or two. Of course, they took extra pains to destroy ammunition trucks and fuel tankers. Where roadside concealment permitted, enemy sappers would attempt close-in attacks with RPGs, grenades, and demolition charges.

Most ambushes were of short duration. The major supply routes had firebases and checkpoints spotted along them, and some cargo might be dropped off at these. This cargo included water trailers at remote checkpoints, where they were exchanged for dry ones. From these bases each morning, engineer teams would clear the road with mine detectors. Teams from each base would work toward each other, and once they linked up the road was opened to military and civilian traffic.

Besides searching for mines and firing wires, they would dribble oil in potholes and worn spots to foil returning minelayers who might emplace mines — they would disturb the oil squiggles, providing a visual sign of tampering. A 5-ton M medium wrecker accompanied each convoy. The 18ft hydraulically extended rotating boom had a 20,lb capacity, plus there was a 40,lb winch on the back and a 20,lb winch on the front. There were four manually operated outriggers for heavy hoisting capabilities, a vice on the front bumper, trailer towing pental hooks on the front and rear, a tool box, and cutting torch.

Besides towing damaged vehicles by lifting the front or rear wheels off the road as required, the boom was used to change truck engines and load cargo into task trucks. At least 50m wide swathes were cleared and then widened to —m and even up to 1,m in some areas. There were areas in the hills and mountains where the degree of slope or rugged terrain prevented clearing. Defoliants were sprayed along roads to keep foliage from growing back, and also on areas inaccessible to Rome plows.

It might be that a fourth. Transportation company headquarters had two 7. This was rather limited firepower considering the threat truckers faced in Vietnam. Some units requested ring mounts, but supply depots often had none. Truck companies were the first support units to receive 5. Six or 12 7. The s concept saw only a need for lighter M60s for defense against limited ground attack.

Transport units were envisioned operating in the corps and army rear areas, and seldom forward of divisional rear boundaries on a conventional battlefield with front lines. The reality of Vietnam was different. The enemy directly threatened convoys; there were no rear areas in the conventional sense, and the front line was in the direction one was facing.

In the case of long-haul truckers, their front line was on either side of their trucks. Their rifles and the few M60 machine guns lacked the necessary range and ability to penetrate dense foliage and trees used as cover by the enemy.

In conventional doctrine, if convoys needed additional protection it was provided by MP companies equipped with M60 machine-gun armed MA1 jeeps. The MPs were overstretched with other missions, however, and lacked sufficient firepower and protection for convoy escort. There were never enough to go around. Another problem was that MPs viewed truck units as just an escort job. Procedures might be different between sectors and coordination with the convoy was not always the best.

In mid the MPs were provided with 73 M V Commando armored cars, but these proved inadequate in firepower and capabilities compared to gun trucks and there were not enough for assignment to truck units.

Activity gradually increased, however. In some areas the enemy was making a concerted effort to harass and destroy convoys — this was especially true on Route 19 in Northern II CTZ. The drivers were not trained to respond to such a devastating ambush and expended their rifle ammunition quickly. They also made the mistake of halting, which allowed the NVA to close in to destroy the trucks at their leisure.

Halting in the kill zone was just what the NVA desired. Take cover and return fire in the direction of the enemy, and be prepared to assault the enemy position and fight your way out.

In addition, the trucks were traveling at close intervals. If they had been at m intervals only ten trucks would have been caught in the kill zone, rather than all Efforts were made to increase security and the first crude gun trucks were soon deployed. In some areas, particularly III CTZ, mechanized infantry battalions and armored cavalry squadrons secured lines of communications. ARVN and Korean infantry units also secured routes.

Many of the roads were unpaved and rough, forcing trucks to travel slow and tanks and APCs could keep pace with them. Elements with APCs and tanks were spotted along and patrolled the main roads.

Firebases and outposts were sited along the highways. These heavy armored cars were not as effective as gun trucks. Many crew removed gun shields, as they restricted observation. C the concept that high speed was one of the best counter-ambush defenses. The 48th Trans Group in III CTZ opposed gun trucks, maintaining that the combat commander in the area was responsible for convoy security as per conventional doctrine.